Communicating with China through China Study Center Nepal

ByUpendra Gautam

Rationale

This year, Nepal and China are celebrating the platinum anniversary of their modern diplomatic relationship. Twenty-five years ago, on August 1—the same date that Nepal and China officially established diplomatic ties in 1955— the first General Assembly (GA) of China Study Center Nepal (CSC in short) was held under the chairmanship of Mr. Madan Regmi. A key objective of the meeting was to elect the organization’s first Executive Committee (EC).

CSC, along with its constitution, was formally registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Nepal, in May 1999. This civil society organization was the outcome of a collaborative effort between independent intellectuals from Nepal and China. It took the Nepali group nearly one and a half years to fully understand and agree on the purpose of the proposed organization. The central question they considered was: How will this organization differ from other ceremonial, non-governmental groups focused on Nepal-China relations?

On January 21, 1999, Mr. Regmi chaired the first formal meeting of the proposed organization at Chu Fang Restaurant, Panipokhari (east of the previous location of the US Embassy in Kathmandu). The select Nepali members present at the meeting finalized discussions and agreed on the organization’s name, and purpose. It was named China Study Center Nepal—a name chosen to reflect the global importance of China’s growing foreign policy, strategic role, and economic rise. The name also acknowledged Nepal’s need to enhance its regional and international engagement through China, given its landlocked geography.

For the group, the core rationale of CSC was grounded in the recognition of One China: a sovereign nation liberated from colonial suppression, with its integral regions—the Tibet Autonomous Region and Taiwan, where the reunification process was ongoing. Historically, Nepal and Tibet have shared deep cultural and trade ties through the high western Himalayan trade routes connected to the ancient Silk Road. Like other independent South Asian countries, Nepal has supported the One-China policy concretized by geo-strategic, historical, ecological, cultural, and commercial interlinkages. We believe China has consistently supported the sovereignty and independent development of countries like Nepal.

Based on this rationale, CSC set out its main objective: to strengthen Nepal-China relations through informed and meaningful communication at all levels—policy, senior official, think tank, and people. To achieve this, the organization planned non-partisan, systematic, and results-oriented activities. The basic criteria for CSC membership were simple: A Nepali citizen who is not only friendly toward China but also capable and willing to intellectually contribute to the partnership between the two nations. From the beginning, CSC was not intended to be a mass-based or activist group. Its focus has always been on policy research, guided by local knowledge and practical expertise.

Organization

The January 21, 1999 meeting was notable for the interdisciplinary presence of respected professionals, including Mr. Madan Regmi (litterateur); late Prof. Ballav Mani Dahal (Tibetologist); Dr. Binayak Bhadra (economist and planner); Dr. Saroj Dhital (surgeon and author); late Mr. Chakra Das Rajbhandari (entrepreneur); Mr. Tamla Ukyab (diplomat); late Mr. Govinda Bhatta (philosopher/author); Mr. Ganga Prasad Upreti (academic); Mr. Sundar Nath Bhattrai (diplomat); Mr. Krishna Silwal (engineer); Prof. Bishweshor Man Shrestha (business and management expert); and Dr. Upendra Gautam (institution and policy specialist).

The meeting unanimously elected a 13-member Executive Committee, consisting of:

Mr. Madan Regmi – Chairman

Mr. Sundar Nath Bhattarai and Prof. Bishweshor Man Shrestha – Vice-Chairmen

Dr. Upendra Gautam – Secretary General

Mr. Ganga Prasad Upreti – Treasurer

Mr. Prakash Babu Paudel – Secretary

Members: Late Prof. Ballav Mani Dahal, Dr. Binayak Bhadra, late Mr. Govinda Bhatta, Mr. Tamla Ukyab, late Mr. Chakra Das Rajbhandari, Mr. Krishna Silwal, and Dr. Saroj Dhital.

Among these, several executive personnel—Mr. Ukyab, Mr. Bhattarai, Dr. Gautam, late Prof. Dahal, late Mr. Bhatta, Mr. Silwal, and Dr. Dhital—had direct academic or professional experience of the Chinese society and governance.

From 1999 to 2014, General Assembly meetings were typically held every three years to elect the Executive Committee by consensus. Until 2014, Chairman Regmi provided steady leadership, supported by Mr. Bhattarai and Prof. Shrestha as vice-chairmen; Dr. Gautam as secretary general; Mr. Upreti as treasurer; and Mr. Paudel as secretary.

Continued Association: During this time, CSC, besides executive officials, was also privileged to have two notable executive members: Dr. Prakash Neupane and Ms. Deepa Pradhan. Both received their education in China and developed a deep understanding of Chinese values and systems.

Ms. Pradhan, fluent in Chinese, was actively involved in CSC’s programs and operations. In 2016, she resigned from her position. Unfortunate as it was, she was deeply hurt when the CSC administration failed to welcome her with proper respect and instead used harsh language. When she attended a CSC reception in 2016 with her baby daughter, she was treated as though she had violated protocol—an experience that left her disheartened. Her departure created a significant void at CSC in terms of merit and contribution.

Dr. Neupane has remained a steadfast supporter of CSC through every challenge. As a leading cancer specialist, he has a demanding professional life, yet he never treated CSC’s responsibilities lightly. Always punctual and committed, his dedication stood out even when he was unwell with a fever and had not been informed about a meeting. Upon receiving a last-minute request, he drove himself to the venue and represented CSC professionally and on time. We sincerely hope for Dr. Neupane’s continued involvement and support for CSC in the years to come.

Challenging Years

The formative 15 years of CSC under Mr. Regmi were, to say the least, challenging. The Indian media and some members of the Indian Parliament repeatedly accused CSC and its regional branches of being “Chinese spy outposts on Indian.” They claimed that a Chinese diplomat attended CSC meetings and alleged that China provided annual funding of Rs. 50 million to support CSC activities. These critics even called on the Indian National Congress-led government to immediately stop what they described as “activities threatening India.”

It’s worth recalling that both CSC and the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation (RGF) in India had a common counterpart in China—the China Association for International Friendly Contacts (CAIFC). At the time, CAIFC was headed by the late Mr. Huang Hua, a respected former vice-premier and foreign minister of China. Huang Hua had played a pivotal role in securing China’s rightful place as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. With deep insight into Trans-Himalayan geopolitics, he warmly received CSC delegations at the Great Hall of the People and remained consistently supportive.

During the visits of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (April 2005) and President Hu Jintao (November 2006) to India, China contributed US$100,000 and US$200,000, respectively, to the RGF.

Chinese officials spoke highly of CSC. Their support was concentrated on covering translation and printing costs of selected Chinese books and certain seminars.

Golden Years of Mutual Communication

Despite the southern skepticism that viewed any Nepal-China cooperation with suspicion, the first 15 years of CSC Nepal marked a golden era in mutual communication across—policy, people-to-people, senior official and think tank levels. I feel happy to have discharged my organizational role in programming activities that were consistent with the rationale and purpose of CSC across all the levels of communication.

Policy: Several Prime Ministers of Nepal—including the late Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, late Girija Prasad Koirala, Sher Bahadur Deuba, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Jhala Nath Khanal, late Sushil Koirala, Khadga Prasad Oli, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda)—valued Nepal-China relations and acknowledged the work of CSC.

They warmly received visiting academic and policy delegations from CSC’s Chinese counterparts, namely CAIFC and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), holding discussions at both their offices and residences.

CSC signed MoUs for regular contact and exchanges with CAIFC in 1999 and CICIR in 2007.

PM Bhattarai impressed visiting Chinese delegates with his wit, humor, and insightful geopolitical analysis. On one occasion, a Chinese delegation gifted him a symbolic tripod vase, representing the balance and stability needed in Nepal’s new democratic journey.

PM Girija Koirala was candid and respectful. He once shared an Indian claim that its officials were in contact with China regarding Nepal’s evolving political scenario.

PM Deuba, typically reserved, was direct and welcoming during his early meetings with Chinese delegates.

PM Nepal provided thorough, ideologically grounded analyses during interactions.

PM Khanal appeared confident and open to taking calculated risks for the national interest.

Late PM Sushil Koirala, known for his simplicity, refrained from making commitments without full consideration.

PM Oli often discussed connectivity between China and eastern Nepal, especially via the Kimathangka-Koshi corridor.

Chairman Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai held ideological discussions with CICIR delegates, touching on regional and international issues.

Notably, these leaders welcomed Chinese delegations even when they were not in government, acting instead as senior political party leaders.

People-to-People: This period was equally remarkable for CSC Nepal’s engagement with the broader public through publications. These efforts aimed to inform the Nepali public about China’s history, society, politics, and Nepal-China relations by means of dissemination of right information that strengthen understanding and cooperation.

Key publications include:

Political History of China (Nepali) – Sadamukh Thapa, 2001

South Asia and China, 2003 – Seminar proceedings compiled and edited by Upendra Gautam

The Social History of Tibet (Nepali) – Raju Poudel, 2004

China, the United States, and Nepal, 2004 – Edited by Upendra Gautam

Nepal’s Security Strategy (Nepali) – Wang Chung, 2005

Taiwan Questions-In Question-Answer Format n Nepali-Date not available

China Through Latticed Window – Bishweshor Man Shrestha, 2007

Transformation of Tibet (Nepali) – Bashudev Dhakal, 2008

From the Roof of the World to Sea Coast – Bishweshor Man Shrestha, 2009

Journal of International Affairs – Biannual, edited by Upendra Gautam and Bishweshor Man Shrestha, 2009-

China in Brief (Nepali) – Edited by Upendra Gautam, 2010

My Father: Deng Xiaoping – The War Years (Nepali) – Deng Rong, a publication coordinated by Upendra Gautam, 2011

Ten Days in Tibet (Nepali) – Ganga Prasad Upreti, 2012

China’s New Leadership: Fifth Generation – Edited by Mohan Lohani & Shreedhar Gautam, 2013

The Case of Farmers’ Water User Associations for Rural Reform in China – Upendra Gautam, Nepalese Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2014

Development of Tibet (Nepali) – Pradeep KC, 2015

Scholars’ Eyes on the Development of Tibet – Bhoopa Dhamala, 2015

Up and Out of Poverty: Xi Jinping (Nepali) – Translated by Sundar Nath Bhattarai, 2015

Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Volume I (Nepali) – a publication Coordinated by Upendra Gautam, 2016

Nepal and China Tibet – Madhab Acharya, a publication coordinated by Sundar Nath Bhattarai, 2016

"Book Penned by Xi Jinping: An Essential Reading for Nepal" – Upendra Gautam, The Rising Nepal, Dec. 15, 2016

China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor – Edited by Sundar Nath Bhattarai, seminar jointly organized by CSC and CICIR, 2017

"With China, Nepal Loses Nothing but Chains" – Upendra Gautam, The Rising Nepal, Jan 19, 2017

"China and South Asia: Governance for Cooperation in the Context of Sino-US Relations" – Upendra Gautam, Jinjiang Orient Forum, 2019–2021

Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Volume II (Nepali) – 2020

The Fight Against the Coronavirus (Nepali) – Translated by Sundar Nath Bhattarai, 2020

Upendra Gautam regularly contributed policy reviews for CSC and wrote extensively on bilateral issues. His articles appeared in China Daily (e.g., July 28, 2008), Wen Hui Bao, The Rising Nepal, and The People’s Review. His articles published in China were reprinted by Spotlight magazine and other broad sheet Nepali newspapers.

Senior Official: Without listing all the examples, five notable senior-level interactions stand out for their long term significance.

During Mr. Wang Yi’s tenure as Vice Foreign Minister in charge of policy planning (2001–2004), a ‘’critical breakthrough” occurred in China–India relations concerning Tibet and Sikkim. Diplomats considered this development meaningful.  

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made an official visit to China in June 2003. During the visit, according to the Chinese side, India formally and explicitly reaffirmed that Tibet is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China. Having such recognition, India was quietly seen withdrawing its political legitimacy of the “Tibetan government-in-exile” operating from India. China on its part agreed to open the Nathu La trade route in the 2003 joint statement. China gradually started removing its international boundary line with Sikkim and also taking out Sikkim from China’s list of disputed regions. China considered the outcomes of Vajpayee Beijing visit were a progress reinforcing its principle of “mutual accommodation of core interests” in the circumstances continued to be affected and clouded by the British colonialist vestiges in the South Asian Himalayan region.  

After Vajpayee’s Beijing visit, CSC delegation led by Mr. Regmi had an opportunity to make a courtesy call on Wang Yi in Beijing.  In the meeting, we candidly made our views on the Sikkim issue as we saw it from Kathmandu. Our considered opinion was: Historically Sikkim has been independent. They were the colonialist who forced it to change its status. History does not inform about the Republic of India’s any legal authority on it. On Tibet, Central government of China has historically been playing a role and discharging responsibility about Tibet’s administration and external security. By inducing an externalized change in the status of Sikkim, Nepal and China had lost a common traditional eastern Himalayan neighbor. Our point of view was: Sikkim was an issue that makes an impact on Nepal’s socio-political interest.

I found the courtesy call was educative while I had the reminiscences of my three- day trip of Gangtok in April 1975 when India’s Central Reserve Police Force was fully mobilized and Indian administration had taken over.  Same year in February, ahead of the Sikkim change, King Birendra was crowned in Nepal. King Birendra in his coronation-speech proposed to declare Nepal a “Zone of Peace” and asked the world community to recognize his proposal.  China officially supported King Birendra’s proposal soon after it was introduced. Chinese Foreign Ministry Position on the proposal was: "China respects the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Nepal and supports all efforts made by Nepal to safeguard its national independence and peace. The Chinese government appreciates and supports King Birendra’s proposal to declare Nepal a Zone of Peace."

Functionaries of CSC had several discerning meetings with Mr. Ai Ping both in Kathmandu and Beijing. He is vice-foreign minister at the International Department of the Central Committee of CPC. He led many meetings with foreign delegations that visited China at the invitation of China Association of International Understanding. In the immediate before and after days of ascendance of Mr. Narendra Modi to the position of prime minister of India, Ai Ping looked optimistic about China-India-Nepal trilateral ties on joint development of hydropower for the regional development. There was even a sort of consistent conversation goingon between Bihar, where Nitish Kumar was the chief minister, investors and entrepreneurs of Gujrat, a state Modi led before he became the prime minister; and Chinese stakeholders. China was ready to come with required technology and allied investment, Gujrat with investment and entrepreneurship and Nepal with its hydropower potential. At one point, Ai Ping as the then director-general of the International Department, even offered a pleasant surprise to Upendra Yadav and his political party when he honored their invitation by attending the Party’s general meeting in Birgunj. Our general point of view in the meetings with him was: Vicissitudes have repeatedly revisited the nations in South Asia. The colonialist vestiges have kept on disrupting logical socio-economic development in our ties. To be hopeful was indeed looking forward, but without being sincere with one another how enterprises could jointly harvest the comparative advantages of Nepal, India and China for long sought cooperation in regional development? Our role may first concentrate on what is practical to mutually benefit our bilateral ties.   

In March 2006, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, who served as China's Foreign Minister from 1998–2003, visited Nepal. He was the top Chinese official who met King Gyanendra for the first time and, also held separate meetings with senior opposition leader Girija Prasad Koirala and other political party leaders at Hyatt Regency. At a special function organized by CSC in his honor, Councilor Tang emphasized the need for reconciliation among Nepal’s “constitutional forces.” He encouraged dialogue to resolve the political crisis, stating:

“A Nepal of peace, reconciliation and amity, enjoying stability, development, and prosperity, serves the fundamental interests of its people and will promote regional peace, stability, and development.”

Another example came in December 2007, when a delegation led by Mr. Wang Jiarui, Minister and Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), visited Nepal. He engaged in extensive discussions with political leaders. The visit aimed to enhance party-to-party and country-to-country relations, and to gain insight into Nepal’s ongoing peace process and upcoming Constituent Assembly elections. CSC functionaries also held discussions with him and shared political perspectives.

In March 2008, Mr. He Yafei, China’s Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Nepal and met with political leaders, including the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the Chief of Army Staff. Discussions centered on Nepal’s peace process and development. At a program organized by CSC at Yak and Yeti, He Yafei, delivering his speech ex tempore in English, conveyed China’s best wishes for lasting peace in Nepal. The event was attended informally by CPN-Maoist Chairman Prachanda and Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal, along with other distinguished guests from all walks of life.

Think Tank-to-Think Tank: CSC’s think tank-level interactions were guided by formal MoUs, enabling regular and in-depth exchanges. These interactions allowed both sides to share analyses on bilateral and regional priorities, opportunities, and risks.

CSC maintained long-term relations with CAIFC and CICIR, and is currently working to establish regular collaboration with Leshan Normal University. On a need-based basis, CSC Nepal has also interacted with institutions like the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Tibet University, Xizang Academy of Social Sciences (XASS), Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, and the China Association for International Understanding.

Another format of engagement involved single, task-based events—often part of China’s broader efforts to communicate its long-term security, development, and civilizational strategies to the global community.

In China, think tanks are policy-oriented, and their research is valued for practical utility in assessing policy effectiveness.

In June 2025, a new milestone of collaboration was reached by implementing a task-based field research work. CSC supported XASS–Institute of South Asian Studies to undertake the work on the proposed China-Nepal Friendly Industrial Park in Damak—a project included in the schedule of the BRI Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in December 2024 between Nepal and China.

In the first week of July 2025, Xizang Minzu University’s Tibet University South Asia Research Institute organized a three-day diplomatic conference on 'Crossing the Himalayas: South Asia Regional Cooperation Development' to celebrate the 70th anniversary of China-Nepal diplomatic relations. Delivering a speech at the event, Upendra Gautam explained that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, together with the One-China Principle, are foundational to this relationship.

Organizational Impact

In 2014, due to prolonged illness, Mr. Regmi nominated his diplomat friend, Mr. Bhattarai, as the Officiating Chairman of the CSC. This decision placed Mr. Bhattarai in charge of administrative responsibilities. However, over the past decade, due to his advanced age and health condition, the Center’s executive functioning has suffered, leading to organizational and procedural gaps, as operations could not adhere to established provisions. CSC’s website, www.cscnepal.org.np, has remained inactive since 2015. Yet, Mr. Bhattarai has continued to carry out his administrative duties, maintaining CSC’s formal presence at events. Prof. Dr. Mohan Lohani, a senior advisor to CSC, has consistently contributed to elevating the relevance of policy discussions at hand.

Throughout its 25-year history, CSC, with a small but dedicated staff, has operated from rented office spaces in New Plaza, Dillibazar, and now Kalikasthan, Kathmandu—courtesy of Mr. Basudev Dhakal, the Center’s Publication Officer. Although a detailed blueprint for a permanent CSC House was prepared long ago by Mr. Mahendra Bahadur Karki, a colleague of the Center, the plan remains unrealized.

Perception of Foreign Influence

In the past decade, attempts were made to inject a foreign (non-Indian) ideological influence into CSC. This influence often perceived CSC as a “communist” organization, due to its independent and professional connections with China. It also viewed CSC’s limited organizational and financial resources as a point of vulnerability.

A lunch meeting on July 20, 2016 with a foreign representative illustrated this view. One question posed to me was: “You are so independent in your thinking; why not to shift your organization towards democratic values?”

My response was simple: “Is democracy about imposing one’s political values on another? Let’s move forward by respecting each other’s organizationally chosen path.”

Interestingly, South Korea’s view of CSC was fact-based and pragmatic. Korean diplomats engaged in policy-level discussions with CSC on Nepal-China ties. When I asked a senior Korean diplomat why South Korea couldn’t join Nepal and China in BRI-related investments, his reply was reasonable.

“We are willing. But first, we need Nepal to have a sovereign credit rating from an independent agency to determine its investment-worthiness.”

Nepal received its first-ever sovereign credit rating only in November 2024. Fitch Ratings awarded Nepal a BB- grade, the second highest in South Asia after India (Source: Cherie Media, “Nepal Achieves First Sovereign Credit Rating,” November 29, 2024)

The Royal Massacre and Its Fallout

The Royal Palace Massacre of June 2001, which killed King Birendra and his entire family, brought deep political and policy instability to Nepal. For some Indian agencies, this instability was something they could manage through existing mechanisms within Nepal. Their strategic thinking yet remained clouded by the memory of their 1962 war with China.

India saw the post-Birendra era as an opportunity to fully assert itself in Nepal. For China, however, the loss of King Birendra—a trusted friend—was a deep shock. The massacre did occur just after about a few weeks Premier Zhu Rongji visited Nepal (May 2001).

President Hu Jintao, though a former Party Secretary of Tibet (1988–1992), did not visit Nepal during his presidency. However, his respect for neighboring countries was clearly shown during the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 2009, where King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia was invited as a special guest. The massive celebration included a 10,000-strong military parade and a civilian march with 100,000 participants.

Invited by our counterpart organization in Beijing, Mr. Regmi and I had the honor of attending the 60th anniversary celebration. Watching the event from the grandstands in Tiananmen Square, we couldn’t help but reflect on how significant King Birendra’s presence would have been at such a historic occasion!

The article was first appeared in the Spotlight News Magazine.