-A look back to 1950–2024-

By Dr. Upendra Gautam

The mountains remember everything. From the winds of revolution that crossed Mustang’s cliffs in 1950, carrying message of China’s People’s Republic in Tibet, to the rustle of monks’ robes along the alleys of Boudha, Kathmandu—Nepal has stood resilient at the silent edge of history, always listening. That year, 1950, Chinese archives described the peaceful liberation of Tibet as a step toward “national unity and frontier consolidation.” ¹ Indian dispatches from the External Affairs Ministry marked it as “strategic realignment on the Himalayan crest.” ² American consular reports from Calcutta wrote of “a new curtain of power rising along the roof of the world.” ³ Nepal, cautious and observant, read them all.

The Rana regime, fragile and insular, realized that its northern horizon had broadened. Tibet, a cultural and trade entity, was now on a broader pathway of reintegration. Nepali officers who had carried letters to the Kashag (Council of advisers- was first established in 1721 by the Qing-Manchu Emperor of China) in the period of 1720 1951, receiving information from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army liaison. By 1955, Kathmandu and Beijing exchanged formal diplomatic missions. The Report on China-Nepal Relations from Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded “Nepal’s friendly neutrality,” ⁴ while Nepal’s own Foreign Ministry Memorandum 7/1955 noted China’s “measured, calm diplomacy.”

Then 1959 geopolitics intruded. The Dalai Lama’s personal radio received the decoded message encouraging him and his followers to flee south through Nangpa La, Mustang, and Humla. CIA records, later declassified in the CIA Recodes Search Tool Archive (National Security Council, 1964), describe “Tibetan resistance units supplied through Mustang, under covert support arrangements.” ⁵ Indian military intelligence (Northern Command archives) lists “logistical coordination under Indian observation.” ⁶ The Nepalese Army, aware but overextended, chose containment over confrontation. A senior colonel’s remark quoted in Home Ministry Field Note, 1962, indicated the low counter- intelligence capacity of Nepal: “We cannot chase every shadow that crosses the snowline.” ⁷

China called them incursions. The PLA Western Command, in its 1960 internal briefings, identified the area “sensitive infiltration corridor via Mustang.” ⁸ American diplomatic cables of the same year described Nepal as a “fragile buffer of exceptional leverage.” ⁹ King Mahendra understood this leverage. His vision of neutrality became architecture. In 1961, Nepal and China signed a boundary treaty, among the first clear demarcations of the China’s Tibet frontier. The Chinese record (Treaty Series, MFA Beijing, Vol. 3, 1961) highlighted Nepal’s “respect for territorial integrity.” ¹⁰ The Indian Ministry of External Affairs noted it “narrowed India’s strategic breathing space.” ¹¹

Tibetans were there. By 1965, clusters had appeared in Boudhanath, Jawalakhel, and Pokhara. The UNHCR Kathmandu Field Report, 1967 estimated nearly 20,000 arrivals. ¹² The Dalai Lama’s Dharamsala administration in exile coordinated welfare from afar. Nepal balanced compassion with caution. Chinese diplomats frequently raised “security concerns” recorded in the Beijing–Kathmandu Political Consultations Minutes, 1972. ¹³ The U.S. Embassy’s annual human rights reports, beginning 1978, routinely mentioned “restricted freedoms for Tibetan organizations.” ¹⁴

Through the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese reform consistently turned autonomous Tibet into a development frontier; Indian politics sought stability after its northern war. Nepal played neutral. American cables (Reagan Library, NSC Papers, 1984) discussed “humanitarian entry routes” across Nepal, while internal Chinese intelligence briefs (PRC MSS Compilation, 1985) warned of “foreign exploitation of religious institutions.” ¹⁵ Nepal’s Home Ministry Security Digest, 1986 treated these as “routine oversight issues.” ¹⁶

Then 1989 came. India’s economic blockade tightened the plains; Nepal turned north for relief. In Beijing, attention was focused on the beginning of the end of the Cold War and its lingering brutal withdrawal syndromes in East and South Asia. The same year, Chinese Embassy Kathmandu Report No. 47/1989 praised Nepal’s “stability amid external pressure.” ¹⁷ Western embassies lodged notes asking to respect international human rights. For Nepal, the reasoning was simple: internal order before external sympathy.

Democracy revisited in 1990, bringing pluralism without national security and socio-economic safeguards. Bhutanese Refugee issue loomed large in Nepal. Tibetans looked at them. NGOs multiplied. Chinese records from the early 1990s (State Council White Paper on Tibet, 1992) emphasized “foreign interference via religious pretext.” ¹⁸ American reports (State Department Tibet Desk Cable, 1993) saw “tightened refugee mobility.” ¹⁹ India maintained deep “religio-cultural” access through Dharamsala channels but looked avoiding direct entanglement in Nepalese administration.

The anti-government force called the Maoists waged a civil war (1996–2006) redrawing the state’s internal priorities. Chinese analysts in PLA Western Command Security Bulletin, 2002 termed it “unintended ideological spillover.” ²⁰ U.S. and Indian security services liked to portray it as “regional destabilization risk.” ²¹ Nepal’s central army command classified Tibetan front as “non-priority, non-combatant zones.” ²² For a decade, the northern frontier was calm while the southern plains burned.

By 2008, Nepal’s monarchy ended; China’s Olympics began. The Chinese State Council Yearbook, 2009 recorded “Nepal’s firm cooperation in curbing separatist protests.” ²³ Leaked U.S. Embassy Kathmandu Cables (Wikileaks, 2010) saw it as “Kathmandu’s over-correction toward Beijing” ²⁴ while Nepal defended its stance as “national security management.” ²⁵

Then came connectivity. In 2017, Nepal signed the Belt and Road Framework Agreement. ²⁶ Beijing’s white paper praised Nepal’s “trustworthy frontier governance.” ²⁷ India’s MEA Brief, 2018 called it “strategic encroachment under development rhetoric.” ²⁸ The United States mentioned Nepal in its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 2019 as “a partner of shared democratic values.” ²⁹ Nepal, as usual, aligned with none, echoed all.

By 2020, COVID pandemic closures turned borders into sealed membranes. PLA Western Theater Reports confirmed “joint patrol cooperation.” ³⁰ The Nepal Home Ministry Circular 14/2020 directed “zero tolerance to illegal border crossings, including Tibetan movements.” ³¹

The story endures in softer spaces. Boudhanath glows. Tibetan prayer wheels spin beside Nepali divine color. Young monks speak Nepali fluently, their parents’ in the horizon. The UNHCR 2022 Report also noted Tibetan residents as a part of Nepal’s broader urbanized socio-cultural landscape.” ³² China still watches; the U.S. still comments; India still calculates.

In 2024, Beijing’s White Paper on “China’s Neighborly Diplomacy” lists Nepal among “trusted partners.” ³³. The U.S. State Department lauds “Nepal’s democratic endurance.” ³⁴ India reiterates “cultural fraternity and territorial understanding.” ³⁵ It is only Nepali people who with a deep sense of struggle better understand what enables the real continuity—that Nepal’s survival has always rested on native discretion and tenacity-characterized by bamboo like resilience.   

Indicative Archival and Sources

People’s Republic of China, MFA Archives, Tibet Series Vol. I (1950).

Ministry of External Affairs, India: Notes on Tibet Affairs, 1950.

U.S. Consulate Calcutta Dispatch No. 2241, 1950, National Archives (RG 59).

Beijing Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1955.

CIA CREST Declassified Documents, “Project ST CIRCUS,” 1964.

Indian Military Intelligence, Northern Command, 1962 Briefs.

Nepal Home Ministry Field Notes, 1962.

PLA Western Command Internal Briefing, 1960.

U.S. NSC Staff Memoranda, 1961, Eisenhower Library.

China–Nepal Boundary Agreement, 1961 (Treaty Series Vol. 3).

MEA India, Strategic Frontier Notes, 1962.

UNHCR Kathmandu Field Report, 1967.

Beijing–Kathmandu Political Consultation Minutes, 1972.

U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Report, Nepal, 1978.

PRC Ministry of State Security Internal Report, 1985.

Nepal Home Ministry Security Digest, 1986.

Chinese Embassy Kathmandu Report No. 47/1989.

State Council White Paper on Tibet, 1992.

U.S. State Department Cable, Tibet Desk, 1993.

PLA Western Command Security Bulletin, 2002.

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Assessment, 2003.

Nepal Army Operations Division Circular, 2004.

State Council Yearbook, 2009.

U.S. Embassy Kathmandu Cable, 2010 (Wikileaks).

Nepal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Note 2010.

Belt and Road Cooperation Framework Agreement, 2017.

Chinese MFA White Paper, 2018.

Indian MEA Strategic Brief, 2018.

U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 2019.

PLA Western Theater Border Cooperation Log, 2020.

Nepal Home Ministry Circular 14/2020.

UNHCR Nepal Report, 2022.

China’s Neighborly Diplomacy White Paper, 2024.

U.S. State Department Annual Country Report, 2024.

India MEA Policy Statement, 2024.