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By Our Reporter

The security arrangement for the March 5 House of Representatives polls appears, on paper, to be tight. But there is every chance that the security may not work as small risks spiral into big problems if they are ignored. Besides more than 6000 escaped inmates, unaccounted looted weapons during Gen Z protest, and individuals like Durga Prasain posing threats to disrupt the poll, other issues too may also create doubts in the mind of voters to cast their ballots on the voting day.

The Election Commission deserves recognition for taking information threats seriously. Identifying 302 misleading and harmful contents is not a small effort. It reflects a reality we can no longer avoid, digital threats now sit side by side with physical ones. False claims, edited videos, and targeted disinformation can frighten voters, spark clashes, or quietly influence choices. Sending these cases to authorities matters, but speed matters more. Content flagged after it has already spread offers little protection. Quick response teams, timely public notices, and visible penalties can limit the damage. When institutions stay quiet, rumors rush in to fill the space.

The requirement for separate bank accounts for election expenses is another positive step. Hidden money feeds vote buying, muscle power, and intimidation. Nepal Rastra Bank’s circular helps, but oversight cannot stop at forms and filings. Tracking large cash withdrawals in real time, coordinating closely with local banks, and publishing basic spending summaries can deter silent misuse. Enforcement must feel real, not ceremonial.

Security planning by the Ministry of Home Affairs appears detailed and well thought out. Classifying polling centers as normal, sensitive, and highly sensitive shows lessons have been learned. Early surveillance in vulnerable Tarai districts signals readiness, not alarm. Deployment plans involve Nepal Police, the Armed Police Force, and the Nepali Army, with clear numbers on paper. Still, numbers alone do not create safety. Weak coordination, slow responses, or blurred command lines can undo even the best preparation.

Trust at the local level remains fragile. The ward focused coordination model, which includes party representatives and respected community members, is sensible. Voters feel safer when familiar faces are present. Yet this approach needs restraint. Community figures must not become informal enforcers for dominant parties. Clear rules, written responsibilities, and open meetings can help prevent that slide.

Voter movement needs stronger attention. Many threats surface before voters even reach the booth. Safe routes, fixed patrol timings, and transport support for elderly and disabled voters can ease fear. In high risk areas, restrictions on armed groups and alcohol sales must apply evenly. Selective enforcement erodes confidence fast.

Media and civil society also carry responsibility. Reporting unverified claims can inflame tensions. Journalists should rely on confirmed updates from election offices and security agencies, and clearly mark rumors for what they are. Civil society groups can place neutral observers, especially in Madhesh and border districts where fear runs deep.

Technology adds another line of defense. Hotlines, simple mobile reporting tools, and visible QR based complaint systems let voters report threats without walking into a police post. Quick acknowledgment of complaints builds trust, even before action follows.

Political parties cannot behave like spectators. Public commitments to peaceful conduct, firm action against rogue cadres, and coordination with local security officials can lower tensions. Silence from party leaders during flare ups sends the wrong signal.

In the end, the March 5 election will not be measured by how many forces were deployed. It will be measured by how safe ordinary voters felt as they went in and came back out. A calm voter, not an armored booth, marks a free and fair poll.