Nepal As A Buffer or Peripheral State?

Actually It Is a Small State/Power

By Shashi P.B.B. Malla

In a recent commentary, the security analyst Maj. Gen. (retd.) Binoj Basnyat was of the opinion that Nepal was a peripheral or even a buffer state (“Nepal between power and proximity. Sphere, buffer, or strategic actor”/The Himalayan Times, Feb. 3).

Now periphery means relating to or situated on the margins or secondary position, part or aspect.

Considering Nepal’s previous active role in SAARC, or its position as a Zone of Peace during the reign of King Birendra, Nepal was then not at all in the so-called periphery.

Nepal may have been pushed to the periphery during the current transitionary phase, but it is not at all a permanent condition.

In the future, if Nepal does aspire to be an active bridge between the two great civilizations of Asia, i.e. it cannot be pushed to the periphery of its own accord.

As to the question of Nepal being a buffer state, this concept seems to be antiquated.

It was perhaps relevant in the 19^th and in the first half of the 20th Century, but now it is hopelessly out of date.

A buffer state is a geopolitical term most often associated with the balance of power.

It refers to small or weak states that exist on the borders of powerful states and which from the security standpoint of the latter, serve as ‘intermediate cushions’ or ‘crush zones’.

Before the advent of air power buffer states were seen as an insurance against direct and more importantly, surprise hostilities between great powers.

The continued independent existence of these states thus precariously depended on the current state of play regarding both the local and general balance of power.

For example, the states of Central Europe, and especially Poland, were widely regarded during the inter-war years [between the First and Second World Wars] as buffers between Germany and the Soviet Union.

In the same way, Afghanistan and Thailand were the crush zones that could absorb and delay Russian and French penetration into British India in the late nineteenth century. (Graham Evans/Jeffrey Newnham: Dictionary of International Relations).

With the advent of nuclear weapons and drone warfare, the concept of the buffer state – with an inter-relationship to land warfare – has become completely obsolete.

In any case, Nepal applied shrewd diplomacy to avoid being the object of regional conflict between British India and the Celestial Middle Kingdom.

The genial, master strategist Henry Kissinger even conceded: “Nepal skilfully balanced its diplomatic posture between the ruling dynasties in China and India – offering letters and gifts that were interpreted as tribute in China but recorded as evidence of equal exchanges in Nepal, then holding out a special tie with China as a guarantee of Nepal’s independence vis-à-vis India (Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History”, p. 179).

Nepal as a Small State/Power

While acknowledging the difficulties of precise categorization, some analysts assert that small powers are those which fall between middle powers and micro-states.

In this way most states are small or ‘minor’ powers.

S. L. Speigel identifies three groups of states in this class. (Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy, 1972).

The largest class consists of states which seek to play an important regional and even international role – United Arab Emirates, Qatar.

The second group he terms ‘the mavericks’ – those states which seek influence within the region, e.g. Libya.

The third group consists of states which are similar to middle powers in terms of foreign policy style, material resources and development, but they usually have smaller populations, lower GNPs and tend to allocate less expenditure on armed forces and defence, e.g. Denmark, Norway, New Zealand.

The following appear to be the characteristic behaviour patterns of small states/powers: limited involvement in world affairs, strong attachment to inter-governmental organizations, support for international law, avoidance of the use of force and a limited geographical and functional range of foreign policy activities.

As a small power, Nepal could very well punch above its weight if it marshals its full diplomatic capacity.

It must have a strong, functioning Ministry of Foreign Affairs and fully equipped and motivated embassies and consulates abroad.

These should not be mere representations for the sake of representation only, but fully manned with trained and smart personnel – not least the ambassador.

They should all not only be willing to react to events – but also take the initiative, i.e. not only wait for instructions from home.

The writer can be reached at:

shashimalla125gmail.com

While not satellite states their freedom of action was a direct function of the security needs of their powerful neighbours