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By Our Reporter

The Maoist Centre and the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) have come closer not out of ideological similarity but due to political necessity. Both find themselves excluded from power after Nepali Congress and UML formed the ruling alliance. This shared status in opposition has pushed them into cooperation, though the relationship is marked by mistrust and competing interests.

The initial bond between the two parties was visible when Maoist Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” took the lead in uniting opposition voices, projecting himself as a guardian of the smaller parties, including RSP. Yet the partnership faltered during the “visit visa scandal,” when Maoists compromised with the ruling parties instead of standing firmly with RSP’s demand for a high-level probe. RSP felt betrayed and accused Maoists of siding with the government. That episode exposed the fragility of their cooperation.

Despite this rupture, recent developments have revived their closeness. The attempt by Congress and UML to remove Deputy Speaker Indira Rana Magar became a rallying point. Both Maoists and RSP saw a direct threat: losing the Deputy Speaker would weaken opposition presence in the Constitutional Council, a powerful body that makes appointments to constitutional positions. By jointly resisting the move, they preserved not only institutional space but also their bargaining power. This common interest has become a glue binding them.

Another factor is the political fate of RSP leader Rabi Lamichhane. His arrest in cooperative fund cases had placed RSP on the defensive. Initially, Prachanda remained silent, but later he expressed public sympathy, accusing the government of authoritarian behavior. His recent visit to Lamichhane in jail was a symbolic gesture, signaling that Maoists see RSP as an ally in resisting what they both describe as the Congress–UML “design” to dominate all state organs. For Prachanda, supporting RSP’s embattled leader strengthens his claim as the broader opposition leader.

For Maoists, this cooperation provides relevance after losing power, while for RSP it brings parliamentary weight and legitimacy. The Maoist Centre gains by projecting itself as the protector of opposition unity, and RSP benefits from Maoists’ organizational strength and experience in countering larger parties. Yet RSP leaders remain cautious, openly suggesting that Maoists’ support may be driven by self-interest, particularly in the Constitutional Council issue.

In sum, Maoist–RSP proximity is situational. It is shaped by exclusion from government, the need to safeguard institutional roles, and shared resentment against Congress and UML. While not rooted in shared ideology, this tactical cooperation could endure as long as both feel marginalized. Still, mistrust and divergent political cultures mean their closeness is more a strategy of survival than a foundation for lasting partnership.