By Our Diplomatic Analyst

China and India's recent decision to make Lipulekh Pass a trade corridor brought to the fore a contentious topic that goes to the heart of Nepal's sovereignty. The Lipulekh issue for Nepal is not just geographical, but one of historical agreements, territorial integrity, and the effectiveness of its diplomacy with two giant neighbors. Following the accord between two bigger neighbors, Nepal sent diplomatic notes, expressing its resentment to both of them. Many Nepalis see India as a hegemon, ready to encroach upon Nepali territory. It is evident from the fact that Nepal has differences with India regarding its border stretching from the east to far-western regions. While India’s bullying tactics is known by all in Nepal, China’s attitude towards overlooking Nepali concerns in Lipulekh is more concerning. Nepal regards China as counterbalance to Indian pressures and bullying against Nepal.

The Sugauli Treaty of 1816 with the British Indian colonial powers clearly mention that the Mahakali River is the border between the two sides. This demarcation was further reiterated in the 1961 Nepal–China Boundary Agreement, where Article 1 recognizes the watershed of the river as the border. These agreements conclusively place Lipulekh within Nepal's territory. Nepal also has proof of its administrative existence: the locals of the region cast their votes in Nepal's first general election held in 1959, villages such as Gunji, Kuti, and Nambi were counted in the 1961 census, and locals continued to pay land revenue to Nepal up to 1962.

Despite this, India has continued to stake its claim over Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, a region of some 335 square kilometers, by interpreting the treaties to its advantage. Nepal has raised the matter time and again since the revival of democracy in 1990, but diplomatic talks have not progressed. India's reluctance to hold boundary demarcation has kept the dispute alive. Meanwhile, analysts state that as the tri-junction point between Nepal, India, and China has not been fixed, the matter is more complex than a bilateral row.

China's acquiescence to accept India's proposal to open a trade corridor through Lipulekh has tightened Nepal's position even further. Despite Nepal and China having already agreed on boundary pillars that show Lipulekh lies in Nepali territory, Beijing's willingness to approve India's venture risks undermining Nepal's claim. To most Nepalis, the move amounts to an implicit acceptance of India's stance, which weakens Nepal's hand in the dispute.

This is not the first such understanding between India and China. In the last ten years, the two countries have entered into such agreements thrice. On each occasion, Nepal has objected but could not take the issue further than filing formal protests. Top-level visits between Nepal and China have been a regular feature, but Nepal has not placed cogent documentary proofs during those interactions to assert its claim over Lipulekh. Such inertia is costly for a small country. Boundary pillars are the ultimate assurance of territory, and Nepal has not pushed this as strongly as it should have.

Nepal's leadership is responsible for such frequent lapses. Our leaders have weakness to raise the issue strongly at all places. It is also true that Nepal no power to bring India to its knee regarding its border encroachment. Our successive governments have failed to stake claim on its land. Now, Nepal needs a sustained diplomatic effort, negotiation, and understanding with both neighbors.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s upcoming visits to China and India provide an opportunity to raise and settle the issue with India. As the Lipulekh issue is fresh and politically charged, it can be made one of the t agendas of the visit. What Nepal needs a concrete diplomatic action that should send a message to both neighbors of its legitimate claim on this strategic area. If Oli fails to seize this moment, the Lipulekh dispute will continue to haunt the small Himalayan nation.