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By Nirmal P. Acharya

In the beginning of 2025, the Trump administration slapped a 25% reciprocal tariff on Indian exports, and again in August Trump signed an executive order subjecting Indian imports to an additional 25% in duties on top of an existing 25% tariff, ramping it up to 50% with additional penalties tied to India’s oil and defense dealings with Russia.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi once stood beside Donald Trump at the “Howdy, Modi!” rally in Houston in 2019 and declared the US president a “true friend of India,” few could have predicted how dramatically that friendship would sour. Five years later, Trump’s return to the White House has transformed goodwill into acrimony and in the process, nudged New Delhi closer to Beijing and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

During Trump’s first term, US–India ties grew on optics, with Modi endorsing Trump before an adoring Indian-American crowd and later hosting him at the “Namaste Trump” mega-event in Ahmedabad. But in Trump’s second term, the tone shifted sharply. Trump branded India a “tariff king” mocking India’s economy as “dead,” further straining public perception and accusing New Delhi of funding Putin’s war.

For years, Prime Minister Narendra Modi projected himself as a strongman leader, fiercely protective of India’s sovereignty and unbending on national security. The Galwan Valley clashes of 2020, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, left an enduring scar on India–China relations and turned public sentiment against Beijing. Modi himself repeatedly vowed to stand firm on border issues and moved swiftly to show strength by banning over 200 Chinese apps that included TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, under the banner of “digital sovereignty” and national security.

Yet, five years later, Modi’s approach looks strikingly different. Driven by shifting geopolitics and the shock of Trump’s trade war on India, Modi has adopted a pragmatic—critics say opportunistic—stance, opening the door to closer cooperation with China even as border disputes remain unresolved. India and China have cautiously resumed diplomatic dialogue, flights and visas have restarted, and both sides are exploring expanded trade. Reports suggest India is considering lifting the ban on TikTok, WeChat, and other Chinese platforms as part of a broader reset with Beijing. India is now leaning more on forums like BRICS and SCO, where China and Russia are central players.

Trump’s tariff war and Washington’s unpredictability has left India exposed. To maintain “strategic autonomy,” Modi opted to balance by drawing closer to Beijing, even at the cost of earlier hardline positions. Meanwhile, Beijing sees an opening. China has framed the SCO as a counterweight to Western alliances. India’s active role, even if pragmatic rather than enthusiastic, strengthens the SCO’s relevance and softens its own isolation.

However, the question of whether China can trust Modi is central to the evolving relationship between New Delhi and Beijing. China will engage with India pragmatically, through SCO, BRICS, and trade, but it will remain cautious. India is not a reliable partner, only a transactional one. Modi may call China a friend today, but tomorrow he may again treat it as an enemy if it serves his political survival. Modi’s record suggests that foreign policy decisions are often driven by short-term political calculations, rather than long-term commitments. Modi’s foreign policy is less about enemies and allies, and more about seizing the political moment.

This dramatic shift is less about reconciliation and more about necessity. With Trump’s tariff war hammering Indian exports and Washington’s reliability in question, New Delhi is hedging by softening its stance toward China. Modi’s opportunism, once a nationalist crusader against China, now a pragmatist ready to embrace Chinese cooperation for economic and strategic convenience, while ignoring Nepal’s sovereignty and inflaming protests over Lipulekh. For Nepal, it is a bitter irony: the same Modi who once warned of Chinese expansionism is now willing to cut deals with Beijing at Kathmandu’s expense.