* Elections In Kashmir After a Decade * U.S. State of the Elections * Sino-American Cold War? * Middle East in Turmoil * Nuclear Proliferation By Shashi P.B.B. Malla Elections in Kashmir Residents of Indian-controlled Jammu & Kashmir are gearing up for their first regional election in a decade that will allow them to have their own truncated government instead of remaining under New Delhi’s direct rule (AP/The Associated Press, Aug. 31). The election will take place between September 18 and October 1, and votes are set to be counted on October 4. Muslim majority Jammu & Kashmir is divided between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan and claimed in its entirety by both. The Indian–administered part has been on edge since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government ended its special status in 2019 and also scrapped its statehood. The three-phased polls will take place amid a sharp rise in militant attacks on government forces in parts of Hindu-dominated Jammu areas that have remained relatively peaceful in the three decades of armed rebellion against Indian rule. India’s main opposition Congress party has formed an alliance to jointly seek the vote with the National Conference, the region’s largest pro-India Kashmiri political party. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has a weak political base in the Kashmir Valley, the heartland of decades of anti-Indian rebellion, while it’s strong in Jammu. The new polls will hardly give the new regional government any legislative powers as Indian-controlled Kashmir will continue to be a “Union Territory”—a region directly administered by the federal or union government – with India’s federal parliament remaining as the region’s main legislature. The elected local assembly will only have nominal control over education and culture. Harris vs. Trump The debate over the debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump has left it unclear under what terms there will be a presidential debate on September 10 – the next defining moment in the contest. There is a sense in America that momentum is shifting toward Kamala Harris. However, Richard Haass, the President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that it is way too soon to take away anything conclusive from the current state of affairs other than we now have a genuine race whereas a month or so we did not --- implying Trump’s victory was a foregone conclusion (Newsletter: Home & Away/Before the Fall, Aug. 30). Haass points to the potential danger that politically motivated officials or bad actors at the state level (Georgia for one) may attempt to delay or obstruct the election certification process. In late 2022, Congress and the White House shored up some of the weaknesses in the Electoral Count Act 0f 1877 that made it all too easy for individual members of Congress to cause mischief and slow or block the tabulation of electoral votes. According to Haass’s assessment, the 75 days between election day and the inauguration of the new president could be of real concern, especially if it appears as though very close votes in a few swing or battleground states [Michigan, Wisconsin, Philadelphia] will hand a victory. Trump’s misogynistic depredations hit a new low last week after he posted yet another crude sexual slur against Kamala Harris, amplifying ugly smears from his sleazy followers, who had been characterized  by Hillary Clinton as ‘a basket of deplorables’. Recent surveys indicate he may pay the price for his chronic and repulsive sexism in a country where female voters outnumber males (Reuters). Trump is a bad loser, and he will contest everything. He can be characterized as the ‘Heads I win, Tails you lose’ candidate!  Sino-American Relations: Hot & Cold US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan traveled to Beijing to meet with Wang Yi, the foreign minister. Sullivan also met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping [way above his rank], and a vice chairman of the country’s Central Military Commission, a man far more important than the defence minister whom U.S. officials usually meet. This has all come about in the aftermath of last November’s Biden-Xi meeting in San Francisco, when both leaders determined, albeit for very different reasons, that it made sense to establish a floor on what had become a relationship in something of a free fall. Regular communication channels, especially at a strategic level such as that between Sullivan and Wang, are to be welcomed, less for so-called deliverables and what they might settle than for reducing the possibility of misunderstandings and communicating the intentions behind certain actions the other side might see as a threat. Taiwan: Bone of Contention Nonetheless, it is hard not to be struck by the lack of a common U.S.-China agenda. China is focused above all on Taiwan, less out of a fear that the island will pursue de jure independence and more out of concern that it is drifting out of reach by forming a separate political and cultural identity and embedding itself in a constellation of liberal democracies (Haass). China is also looking to reduce U.S. tariffs on Chinese manufactured goods and more importantly U.S. export controls on technology. The United States, for its part, is also interested in communicating its position on Taiwan and technology, but from the opposite perspective – it wants to discourage Chinese coercion of Taiwan, signal that Beijing would pay a heavy price if it were to use force against the island, and explain its concerns with Chinese behavior that are driving export controls. Washington also wants to discuss Chinese excess capacity in sectors such as electric vehicles and renewable energy that could have enormous ramifications for American manufacturing. Russia, Nuclear Weapons, Opioids The U.S. side is trying without much success to limit Chinese support of Russia’s military (especially in its war against Ukraine), to rein in its nuclear weapons build-up (China now has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world), and to stop the export of chemical precursors central to the production of fentanyl, which is causing havoc in the United States. The South China Sea The South China Sea is also re-emerging as a dangerous potential flashpoint, as Chinese pressure on the Philippines mounts. The U.S.-China relationship will remain extremely difficult no matter who becomes the 47th president of the United States (POTUS). However, one big question is whether Trump would push back against China in the geopolitical sphere (and be prepared to defend Taiwan) or whether he would only concern himself with transactional issues and bilateral economic matters. Israel & the Middle East In the Middle East, there was an Israeli preemptive attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon that for the moment does not appear to be leading to a serious conflict. And there has yet to be any Iranian retaliation for the brazen assassination of the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Meanwhile the Gaza ceasefire talks remain on life support despite nonstop U.S. urging. In the interim, Israel rescued one hostage in a tunnel network in Gaza, although as Haass has written before, the only way to secure the return of every remaining hostage [including one Nepali student] is through a negotiated ceasefire. The West Bank However, the big news from the region is the developing serious situation in the West Bank, an area just over 2,000 square miles that Israel has occupied ever since the June 1967 Six Day War. Almost three million Palestinians and close to half a million Israelis live in this enclave west of the Jordan River. None of this takes into account Jerusalem, at the southern end, which has a separate, complicated, and controversial political and legal status under International Law. The news is of armed clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants that led to the death of more than a dozen of the latter. While the focus of world attention has been on Gaza and Israel’s northern front with Lebanon and Hezbollah, the West Bank is rapidly emerging as a third front for Israel – or a sixth if one also includes the Houthis of Yemen, the Shia militants in Syria and Iraq, and Iran proper. What increasingly worries Haass is that he can see the West Bank going the way of Gaza. Not in the sense of October 7 [the brutal, surprise Hamas attack on southern Israel], but rather a version of what has happened since, an open-ended, incident-filled, costly grind. There are some troubling similarities, including the emergence of radical armed Palestinian militias, inspired by Hamas and fed up with what is widely judged to be a feckless Palestinian Authority, along with the absence of any Israeli political initiative that would offer Palestinians an attractive political future, much less a state of their own. Then there is the growing number of settlements and settlers, increasing violence carried out by Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians, and an Israeli security and political establishment that tends to look the other way or worse yet abet the land expropriation and violence. The Biden administration has sanctioned some of those behind the settler violence, but as Haass has written in a recent Foreign Affairs article on the history of U.S. management and mismanagement of difficult relationships with friends, US policy towards settlements and settlers over successive administrations has been mostly to look the other way, making US talk of a two-state solution increasingly empty. Nuclear Proliferation Haass also writes this month for Projekt Syndicate about nuclear proliferation, but focused less on the spread of nuclear weapons. He does worry about Iran, which has dramatically reduced the time it would require to develop one or more nuclear devices. An Iran with nuclear weapons might use them – or, even if not, might calculate that it could safely coerce or attack Israel or one or more of its Arab neighbours directly (or through one of its proxies) with non-nuclear, conventional weapons. Haass is increasingly worried about vertical proliferation, which refers to increases in the quality and/or quantity of the nuclear arsenals in the 9 countries that already possess these weapons. The danger is not only that nuclear weapons might be used in a war but also that the possibility of war would increase by emboldening governments tomcat more aggressively in pursuit of geopolitical goals in the belief that they may act with impunity. China’s fast growing nuclear arsenal may very well reflect a belief that if it can match the U.S. in this realm it can deter Washington from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf during any crisis over the island. In the case of North Korea, neither economic sanctions nor diplomacy has succeeded in curtailing its nuclear programme, which we should expect will benefit from increased Russian assistance in the coming years. North Korea is now thought to possess more than 50 warheads. Some are on missiles with intercontinental range that have improving accuracy and can reach the continental U.S. Russia offers another reason for worry. NEW START, (‘Strategic Arms Reduction Talks’) the principal arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, is due to expire in February 2026. Russia might well refuse to extend the treaty, possibly because the performance of its armed forces in Ukraine has left it more dependent than ever on its nuclear arsenal. Or it may seek to barter its willingness to continue abiding by for U.S. concessions on Ukraine. What worries Washington is not only what Russia might do but also that the U.S. now faces three adversaries with nuclear weapons who could coordinate their policies and pose a unified front in a crisis. All this is prompting Washington to rethink its own nuclear posture. As David Sanger reported for The New York Times, the U.S. government reportedly completed its periodic review of its nuclear forces and is grappling with how to adjust its posture to contend with this new reality. At a minimum, billions of dollars will be spent on a new generation of bombers, missiles, and submarines. At worst, we could be entering an era of unstructured nuclear competition. It all adds up to an extremely dangerous moment. The taboo associated with nuclear weapons has grown weaker since the U.S. used them twice against Japan – in Hiroshima and Nagasaki – to hasten World War II’s end. Indeed, Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have hinted strongly at their readiness to use nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Ukraine. They don’t seem to realize that their first use would trigger MAD – mutually assured destruction! Nuclear weapons did play a stabilizing role during the Cold War. But, three and a half decades after the Cold War’s end, a new world order is emerging, one characterized by nuclear arms races, potential new entrants into an ever less exclusive nuclear weapons club, and a long list of deep disagreements in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Haass evaluates that this is not a situation that lends itself to a solution, but at best to effective management. Consequently, “One can only hope that the leaders of this era will be up to the challenge.” The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com