• * The End of the “American Century”?
  • * The U.S. Presidential Race
  • * Modi as Peace-Maker in Ukraine
  By Shashi P.B.B. Malla   The United States at the Crossroads In this contentious American election year, one of the most significant questions is whether we are witnessing the end of an age in which the United States has been the dominant power. One of the most brilliant theoreticians of International Relations, Joseph S. Nye Jr., the former dean of Harvard University Kennedy School argues in the New Atlanticist that this is not the case (Aug. 20). Nye writes that the Cold War ended without the nuclear catastrophe that hung over our heads, but it was replaced by a period of hubris as the United States became the world’s sole superpower. That unipolar moment was soon replaced by fears of trans-national terrorism and cyber wars. Analysts today speak about a New Cold War with a rising China and fear of nuclear escalation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Our mental maps of the world have changed dramatically since World War II. In the past eight decades, we have lived in what TIME publisher Henry Luce, in March 1941 baptized “the American Century”. In the 19th Century, the global balance of power was centered in Europe, which sent its imperial tentacles around the world. The United States was a bit player with a military not much larger than that of Chile. As the 20th Century began, the United States became the world’s largest industrial power, and accounted for nearly a quarter of the world’s economy as it still does today. When US President Woodrow Wilson decided to send two million US troops to Europe in 1917, America tipped the balance in World War I. But after the war, the United States “returned to normal” and in the 1930s became strongly isolationist. Nye insists that it is more accurate to date the American century  in 1941. It was in that context to resists isolationism and urge participation in the war that Luce coined the famous term. Some have referred to an American Empire, but US power always had limits. It is more accurate, according to Nye, to think of the American century as the period since World War II during which time, for better or for worse, the United States has been the pre-eminent power in global affairs. Today, the United States remains the world’s strongest military power as well as the largest economy, but since the 2010s China has become a near-peer economic competitor, and large parts of America have reacted negatively to the disruptions caused by globalization. As yet, this contemporary era has no fixed label, but for lack of a better term may tentatively be called the post-American hegemony. The American Century may not be technically over, but Nye argues that American primacy in this century will not look like the 20th Century. From the American viewpoint, the greatest danger Americans face is not that China will surpass the U.S., but that the diffusion of power will produce political entropy, or the inability to get anything done. Nye concedes that China is an impressive peer competitor with great strengths but also weaknesses. In assessing the overall balance of power the United States has at least five long-term advantages:
  1. One is Geography
The United States is surrounded in the east and west by two oceans (The Atlantic & The Pacific); and in the north and south by two friendly neighbours (Canada & Mexico). On the other hand, China shares borders with 14 other countries and is engaged in territorial disputes – both land and maritime – with several [India, Vietnam, Philippines. It even claims some Russian territory!].
  1. S. is self-sufficient in energy
This is definitely a great advantage, since China depends much on energy imports.
  1. Financial Clout
The United States derives power from its large transnational financial institutions and the international role of the dollar. A credible reserve currency depends on it being freely convertible, as well as deep capital markets and the rule of law, which China lacks.
  1. Demographic Advantage
The United States also has a relative demographic advantage as the only developed country that is currently projected to hold its place – third – in the global population ranking. Seven of the world’s 15 largest economies will have a shrinking workforce over the next decade, but the US workforce is expected to increase, while China’s peaked in 2014.
  1. New Technologies
The United States has also been at the forefront in new technologies – bio, nano, information. China, of course, is investing heavily in research and development and scores well in the number of patents, but by its own measures its research universities still rank behind American ones. All told, the United States holds a strong hand in this great-power competition. Nye argues if Americans succumb to hysteria about China’s rise or to complacency about its “peak” they could play their cards poorly. Discarding high-value cards – including strong alliances and influence in international institutions – would be a serious mistake [thus the grave danger of a Trump presidency]. Nye also insists that China is not an existential threat to the United States unless Us leaders make it one by blundering into a major war. Thus, the historical analogy that worries him is 1914, not 1941. His greater concern, however, is about domestic change and what it could do to U.S. “soft power” [this is a concept that Nye invented in 1990 to describe the ability to get what one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment] and the future of the American Century. He argues that even if America’s external power remains dominant, it could lose its internal virtue and attractiveness to others. Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer but riskier than ever before. U.S. Presidential Elections The U.S. Democratic Party Convention in Chicago last week has generated good vibrations. Like many other observers, Richard Haass, the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has labeled the convention a grand success, both in what it projected and what it avoided. The demonstrations protesting U.S. and Israeli policy in Gaza gained little traction and failed to overshadow what went on inside the convention hall. “Mood more than policy dominated, which is undoubtedly smart” (Haass: Home & Away newsletter/ “Unconventional”, Aug. 23). Chicago 2024 did not reflect Chicago 1968 (when there were widespread protests and demonstrations). The Democrats have successfully laid claim to being the party of optimism and patriotism. They have come a long way from the “Blame America First” party. “Indeed, it is as if they and the Republicans have switched places with the party of Trump focusing on grievances, on all that they see as wrong and very little on what is right” (Haass). The Obamas did their impressive best to get under Trump’s skin with ridicule. Republicans led by Adam Kinzinger who had turned away from Trump were powerful. However, the most important words spoken last week were those of the vice president who would like to be president, according to Haass: “It was an effective, disciplined, and well-delivered speech. It was presidential. She used it not just to introduce herself and her philosophy but to define her opponent and the threat he poses to the country’s democracy and national security .  .  . “She reinforced the message that today’s Democrats believe in individual and collective opportunity .  .  . The “obligation of all citizens, placing country before party or person, was a recurring theme throughout.” Haass goes to the extent of speculating that there may well be a secret anti-Trump vote that isn’t showing up in the polls but that may surface on election day – November 5. In the meantime, The Washington Post writes that Trump is so fixated on Biden’s withdrawal from the race that “It feels like he’s lost his mojo.” Modi in Ukraine In the high stakes global game of musical chairs, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has chosen to hover politely between seats, according to the highly perspicacious ex-diplomats of the International Intrigue newsletter (John Fowler/Valentina Calvi, Aug. 23). They consider Modi’s initiatives that it sometimes (like last month) means a bear-hug with dictator Vladimir Putin the same day his missiles hit a children’s hospital in Kyiv. Other days (like last week Friday), it means arriving in Kyiv after a quick visit to one of Ukraine’s top backers Poland. So what’s Modi up to in Ukraine and Poland? Indian officials (and news outlets) are leaning into the ‘historic’ angle, whether it’s India’s first prime ministerial visit to {oland since 1979, its first-ever to modern Ukraine, or (depending on one’s criteria) its first to a foreign war-zone [the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian borders are regional or local war-zones]. But none of this really explains why Modi is in Ukraine? Fowler/Calvi offer three possible factors: First, Modi himself is staying on message, declaring “we support dialogue and diplomacy for the quick restoration of peace.” After all, he’s one of the few world leaders with any meaningful status or influence in ……. However, neither Russia nor Ukraine seems interested in India’s mediation, and one would have to go back to Krishna Menon’s 1950s role in Indochina to see a comparable example in India’s history [Menon was Nehru’s right-hand man in external affairs]. But still, Modi might see his visit as smoothing out the bad vibes he generated for hugging Putin (the wrong person, at the wrong time and the wrong place). Second, we have to consider India’s defence industrial base. While India is now making strenuous efforts to make more weapons at home – after all, it’s fighting a territorial war on many fronts, that’ll take time. Until then, it’s still the world’s largest arms importer, getting half its armaments from Russia. So with Russia’s Ukraine war now absorbing much of the supply while raising questions about quality, India is pushing to diversify its intake of weaponry. This is where Poland comes into the security equation.
  • Poland, a former Warsaw Pact state, has the expertise to repair India’s military gear from the Soviet-era.
And yes, Poland’s PM has confirmed he and Modi indeed talked about “intensification in terms of the defence industry.”
  • Moreover, it is also not a known fact that Ukraine itself is key to India’s defence industry.
Most of India’s frontline warships, 100 of its military transport aircraft, and most of its military helicopters rely on Ukrainian manufacturers, including for advanced gas turbine engines. Thus, part of Modi’s regional balancing act here is pure military necessity dictated by India’s vital national interests. Of course, like Russia, Ukraine’s ability to supply customers abroad is now considerably curbed by the war at home. But there are persistent rumblings of Ukraine and India aiming for joint venture facilities in India. And third, Modi is arguably just responding to changes within Europe’s own balance of power. Of course, Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels are still the main focus, which is why Modi mostly looked westward during his first 27 visits to the European Union (EU). But he’ll also have noticed how others like Poland now throw their weight around more. But all said and done, none of this means India is stepping away from Russia. To the contrary, it actually confirms India’s musical chairs strategy. In fact, just as Modi was boarding his 10-hour train to Kyiv, word broke that India had now overtaken China as the world’s top importer of Russian oil, getting a record 44 % percent of its supply from Russia. Before the war, it was even less than 1 % percent. India’s ambivalent foreign policy One of Singapore’s legendary diplomats Bilahari Kausikan hit the nail on the head when he described the way more international players are now approaching our world as “omnidirectional”. World capitals will lean any and all ways, depending on their interests and capabilities at the time. It is an apt description for all leaders who’ve visited both wartime Kyiv and Moscow: Hungary, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Guinea-Bissau and now India, which has really gone from non-alignment to multi-alignment. India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar has even written a book about it, with trademark lines like: “many friends, few foes, great goodwill, more influence.” This is India’s foreign policy in action. It has little choice,
  • with a persistent nuclear-armed arch-enemy to your west – Pakistan;
  • A powerful and relentless nuclear-armed rival to your north-west – China; and
  • Your nuclear-armed weapons-supplier starting a war to the north-west (Russia);
There’s a certain logic behind India’s tactics and strategy in external affairs. Modi and Jaishankar have put the ancient Kautilyian doctrine on its head: ‘the friend of your enemy can also be your own friend’ (Russia). It is futile asking whether it will work, because it is already being applied successfully. Western leaders – above all Biden – have responded pretty muted to Modi’s Putin hug, or his Russian oil spree. This is not because the West doesn’t mind, but because its need for an aligned India to balance China far outweighs its dismay at a multi-aligned India. The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com