• What Biden’s Exit Means for the World
  • Possibility/Probability of a Wider Middle East War
  • Venezuela’s Tarnished Presidential Election
  By Shashi P.B.B. Malla United States It was a historic weekend for US politics, as President Joe Biden relinquished his re-election bid and quickly endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris to face former President Donald Trump in November. But it was a big weekend for the rest of the world too.

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As CNN’s Fareed Zakaria heard from former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt on Sunday’s Global Public Square segment, European allies are eyeing the US election quite nervously. Trump’s return to office would reintroduce an isolationist and transactional “America First” foreign policy. His selection of Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio as his running mate bolstered that impression. In an interview with Foreign Affairs, CNN presidential historian and writer Timothy Naftali weighs the impact on other countries. Naftali told senior editor Hugh Eaken: “There is now a better chance that a Democrat will win in November. And so I’d argue that, for the moment at least, foreign leaders have to take seriously the possibility that a member of Biden’s team or someone else from the Democratic Party will be leading the United States, meaning that they may be able to count on support for Ukraine, for example .  .  .    “Some of that lustre may disappear after the beginning of  that an election could alter the country' “But the fact that the Democrats are no longer likely losers I think will influence the way foreign leaders, particularly American adversaries view the Biden administration .  .  . “It is a perilous moment when the national strategy of a great power is so in question that an election could alter the country’s, or at least the leadership class’s, definition of the national interest .  .  . “And it is especially perilous for the international system when the country in question is a superpower .  .  . “The situation introduces an uncertainty into the political calculations of every (foreign) leader.” Harris has now become the Democrats’ presidential nominee. The convention in Chicago will merely be a ‘coronation’. What are Harris’s own foreign policy leanings? Some expect her to be more critical of Israel. The Middle East specialist Sanam Vakil of the UK-based international affairs think tank Chatham House says Harris “will continue the US’s steadfast support for Israel but could prove to be more sympathetic on the case of Palestine.” Harris also has a solid reputation in world affairs standing in for Biden at the Munich Security Conference and at the 2023 ASEAN summit and her forthright criticism of Trump for questioning the US commitment to NATO. The Middle East One of the leading US public intellectuals, Richard Haass has long compared the Middle East region to a part of the world with multiple tectonic fault lines. Any one regional player can produce an earthquake at any time, and another player can set off additional instability in what geologists call sympathetic earthquakes. It is already 10 months since the quake/convulsion of October 7 ushered in a costly war against Hamas in the Gaza strip. Soon thereafter the always uneasy fault line that exists between Israel and Hezbollah, which has its base in southern Lebanon, began to shake. There have also been sympathetic quakes in the West Bank, where there are growing clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have been attacks by Iran on Israel and vice-versa. The Yemen-based Houthis have also joined in by attacking Israel directly, which then responded against targets in Yemen. Spiralling tit-for-tat aggressive actions now seem to be the pattern. Gaza is no longer the principal area of military concern as Israel has all but run out of major military targets there. Thousands of Hamas fighters remain, but there is no feasible plan for eliminating them. Chances for a ceasefire were never good given the gaping gap between the Hamas and Israeli requirements. Prospects are even worse now in the aftermath of Israel’s assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, who led Hamas’s political office in Doha, Qatar and was intimately involved in the ceasefire negotiations. Haass predicts that a low-level, open-ended conflict in the Gaza Strip will now develop. A return of the remaining hostages in Gaza does not seem possible any time soon. Any doubt their return is not a high priority for the Netanyahu government was removed by the wanton killing of Hamas’s chief negotiator. The bigger immediate danger is in the north, on the Israel-Lebanon border. Armed exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah are growing deadlier, the most recent being a Hezbollah attack on a village in the occupied Golan Heights that left a dozen Druze children dead. Then Israel retaliated with a targeted killing of Fuad Shukr, the right-hand man of Hezbollah’s leader, in Beirut. In the current impasse, there does not seem to be a path for the two sides not to allow things to escalate or, better still, to calm things and pull back forces so tens of thousands of Israelis can return to their homes in northern Israel and an even larger number of Lebanese can return to their homes in southern Lebanon. The greatest danger: Iran However, the most dangerous quake/upheaval could come between Israel and Iran. The assassination of Ismael Haniyeh in Tehran, which occurred just after he had attended the inauguration of Iran’s new president and met with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, makes it all but certain an embarrassed Iranian regime will retaliate against Israel. The question is just how and when and where. The last time Iran attacked Israel directly was in April – also in the aftermath of an Israeli assassination, that time in Iran’s diplomatic compound in Damascus. This nearly triggered a costly war. It was possible to avoid one because the Iranian drone and missile attack caused little damage, allowing Israel to respond modestly. This time around things could turn out different. There could be heavy damage in Israel and many could die. Israel would then be tempted to respond in a big way, possibly against sites associated with Iran’s nuclear programme. Israel might also want to come down hard to get Iran to revise its support for its armed proxies – Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis and those in Syria and Iraq. Some in Israel might even hope that a large-scale response could lead to regime change. The point is whether matters would again settle after an exchange of hostilities as they did last time or continue to escalate between the two countries, possibly expanding to the rest of the region or even beyond. In all of this, it does seem that there is an inherent contradiction in the U.S. role. It may possess vast power, but its influence over Israel is limited. Venezuela All indications point to the indubitable fact that Venezuela’s presidential election was stolen by the regime of Nicolas Maduro. The opposition estimates that 60-70 % percent of the voters favoured Edmundo Gonzales, who was the opposition candidate only because the Maduro regime barred “Iron Lady” Maria Corina Machado from running. The government refuses to allow an independent agency – as opposed to one that it controls – to review the voting. The former President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass explores the dilemma that the Biden administration faces. Not to react at all is an option, but it would dilute the proposition that the United States stands for democracy  and basic rights. “Acquiescing could also encourage other autocrats to rig elections as they might decide they had little to fear and much to gain” (Home & Away/Fault Lines, Aug. 2). However, the options for action are very limited. The reflexive response is to impose sanctions. But sanctions make little sense. Venezuela is already one of the most sanctioned countries in the world and the Maduro regime has remained in power for over a decade despite such sanctions. Additional sanctions would increase the already terrible of the people while the autocratic regime would find ways to dodge them, with countries including Russia, China, Cuba and others helping Maduro. Moreover, increased sanctions would swell the number of people leaving the country – akin to an exodus – increasing the social, economic and political pressure on already overwhelmed neighbours like Colombia  and the United States. The United States could be more successful by working with regional states led by Brazil. Collective regional actions delegitimizing and shunning the Maduro regime could also work. The international community must funnel resources to the active opposition and also ensure that the truth continually reaches the broad population. However, any regime change will be extremely difficult as long as the security forces remain loyal to the regime and are both willing and able to strong arm, harass and arrest the opposition. Venezuela on track to becoming a full-fledged dictatorship Not long ago, Venezuela wasn’t a complete autocracy, writes Americas Quarterly editor-in-chief Brian Winter. But after the presidential election, strongman President Nicolas Maduro was announced as the winner despite widespread allegations – including from other Latin American leaders – that the vote results were fraudulent. To Winter, the simple announcement of a Maduro victory – rather than a subtler tipping of scales before a more legitimate vote, through state power or voter suppression – indicates Venezuela has taken a critical next step down the authoritarian path, becoming “a fully rogue, isolated” regime in the mold of Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua (Fareed Zakaria:Global Briefing, Aug. 1). Anne Applebaum details efforts by the opposition to obtain partial tallies – which suggested a landslide opposition victory and, in turn, were corroborated by exit polling done by a leading US firm. “This painstaking collection of evidence, along with the months of preparation needed to produce it, contrasts sharply with the sloppiness of the regime, which has so far not produced a full set “On one side people are defying violence and arrest to reform their country, reverse its downward slide, stop the tide of emigration. On the other side is a slovenly dictator who can’t even compose an intelligent lie.” Speculating about the regime’s thinking, Americas Quarterly’s Winter writes: “I come back to two key assumptions. The first is that what Maduro and his allies fear most is not losing power per se, but spending the rest of their lives in a Supermax federal prison in the United States,” given the indictments they face. The second is that the model of ‘Chavismo’ – the ideas of past President Hugo Chavez that have continued under Maduro – “has always been Cuba, where authorities have ‘successfully’ stayed in power by repressing dissent, ignoring the economy when necessary and exporting malcontents for 65 years and counting .  .  . “Take the long view, the Havana view, and this is another storm that will pass .  .  . “It is possible these assumptions are wrong: “The Venezuelan power structure may be weaker, more divided and eager for change than we appreciate, believing their growing lack of legitimacy at home and abroad to be unsustainable .  .  . “Maduro may be staking out tough ground now in anticipation of an eventual negotiation .  .  .  . “But if Maduro is indeed willing to do whatever it takes to stay in power, then what ever path remains to a democratic transition will be both narrow and extremely dangerous in the days ahead” (Zakaria). The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com